Article III of the IAEA Statute gives the Agency, inter alia, the authority to take and manage safeguard measures. Where the Governing Council approves a safeguards agreement, it shall authorise the Director-General to conclude and subsequently implement the arrangement. Read more → The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Safeguard Measures sets out rules for the application of safeguard measures by WTO member countries. A safeguard measure is a temporary restriction on imports (e.g. B, a quota or increase in customs duties) that a country may impose on a product if imports of that product increase in order to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to a domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive product. IAEA safeguards are incorporated into legally binding agreements. In accordance with the IAEA Statute, States accept such safeguards by concluding such agreements with the Organization. The Agency shall receive draft information on a relevant amendment to the safeguard measures for examination and shall be informed of any changes to the information submitted to it in accordance with Article 44 in sufficient time to allow for the adaptation of safeguard procedures if necessary. 2. When making the notifications referred to in points (b) and (c) of paragraph 1, the Member proposing the application or extension of a safeguard measure shall provide the Safeguard Committee with all relevant information, including evidence of material injury or threat of injury resulting from the increase in imports, a detailed description of the product concerned and of the proposed measure, the proposed tax date, duration and timetable for progressive liberalisation.
In the event of an extension of a measure, evidence shall also be provided that the sector concerned is making an adjustment. The Council for Trade in Goods or the Committee on Safeguard Measures may request from the Proposing Member the application or extension of the measure it deems necessary such additional information as it deems necessary. It is in the interest of the members of the Agency that, without prejudice to the principles and integrity of the Agency`s safeguards system, the expenditure of the Agency`s financial and other resources for the implementation of such an agreement does not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective of the agreement. (d) International interdependence, in particular the extent to which nuclear material protected under this Convention is received or shipped from other States for use or processing from other States; all related audit activities of the Agency; and the extent to which the activities of entities applying safeguard measures under this Agreement are linked to those of other States; the Protocol on Small Quantities is a protocol that can be concluded in conjunction with a comprehensive safeguards agreement. It has been available since 1971 and its text was standardized in 1974 (original protocol for small quantities). (ii) information on facilities shall constitute the minimum necessary for the safeguarding of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. G. Effective kilogram: a special unit used to secure nuclear material.
The quantity in effective kilograms shall result from the following measures: In accordance with Article 7, the Agency shall, in carrying out its verification activities, make full use of the United States system for the accounting and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary duplication in the accounting and control activities of the United States. (e) technical progress in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling in the assessment of nuclear material flows. At the request of the United States, the Organization shall exempt nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provided that the total quantity of nuclear material exempted in the United States under this article is subject to safeguards during negotiations along the lines of pa The United States has undertaken to accept the same safeguards that non-nuclear-weapon States should accept, with only information and activities of direct importance to national security in the United States and locations related to such information and activities have been excluded. On June 12, 1998, the United States fulfilled this commitment by signing a PA. The U.S. PA, which entered into force on January 6, 2009, marked an important milestone in the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the United States. Each of the five NWS has adopted an AP, but the United States. AP is unique in integrating all provisions of the AP model in every way, subject only to the exclusion of national security. (vi) exemption: exemption from safeguards of nuclear material by reason of its use or quantity; In February 1989, the United States concluded a safeguards agreement in accordance with its obligations under Protocol I to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean or the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
This Protocol shall apply to the territories of the Region under the jurisdiction of States outside the Region. As a party to this Protocol, the United States is required to apply the denuclearization provisions of the Treaty to the territories of the United States in the area to which they apply. Pursuant to that commitment, the United States has agreed to accept IAEA safeguards on all sources or special fissile material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the territory of United States Protocol I. The Agreement of 17 February 1989 between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Application of Safeguards Related to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is a comprehensive safeguards agreement in respect of those Territories. Due to the small amount of material in the territories, this agreement also contains a small-quantity protocol that keeps many of its provisions in limbo. From then until 1988, the IAEA continued the practice of selecting another commercial fuel plant and two power reactors for protective measures at intervals of about two years. Each time new facilities were selected, the current plant was removed from selection under the agreement and the selection was manufactured in accordance with the reporting protocol. In August 1981, the IAEA also selected a decommissioned state research reactor that stored a lot of plutonium to meet an existing commitment by the United States and the IAEA to secure two kilograms of plutonium. 3. The right of suspension referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be exercised during the first three years in which a safeguard measure is in force, provided that the safeguard measure was taken following an absolute increase in imports and that the measure complies with the provisions of this Agreement. In early 1981, IAEA made its first selection of facilities in which the entire system of protective measures, including inspections, was applied in accordance with the Agreement itself.
Two commercial reactors in operation and one commercial fuel production plant were selected. The facilities provided design information and negotiations were initiated on each of the detailed „facility annexes“, the detailed description of the implementation of safety precautions at that particular facility. During these negotiations, the IAEA carried out ad hoc inspections at the facilities, as permitted by the agreement. These first annexes entered into force at the beginning of 1982. It was also at this time that the IAEA made its first selection under the declaration protocol for two commercial fuel plants. In July 1983, the United States added the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant to the list of eligible facilities, and the following August it was selected by the IAEA for protective measures. .